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INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 2004, pharmaceutical giant Merck & Co.
("Merck") announced that it would immediately withdraw
revolutionary painkiller Vioxx from the global market.1 The swift
action came six days after Merck's CEO, Raymond Gilmartin,
received a call from the company's chief researcher informing him
that an outside panel had abruptly halted a post-market Vioxx trial
due to concerns that the drug may increase the risk of heart attack or
stroke.2 The financial impact on the drugmaker will be substantial.
Doctors wrote an estimated 100 million prescriptions for Vioxx from
its launch in 1999 until 2004, and the drug accounted for 11% of
Merck's global sales in 2003.3 Its loss is expected to reduce the
company's profit by 20%.'
1. Barbara Martinez et al., Expiration Date: Merck Pulls Vioxx from Market After
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Former Vioxx users began filing suits against the pharmaceutical
giant less than a week after Merck's announcement.5 On August 19,
2005, a jury in a Texas state court returned a verdict against Merck in
the first of the Vioxx trials, rendering a staggering $253.45 million
judgment.6 As of October 2005, over 5,000 suits related to the
painkiller still awaited adjudication in state and federal courts
nationwide,7 and analysts estimate Merck's potential liability at as
much as $20 billion.8
Months after Merck's initial announcement, as thousands of
cases began consolidating, each side started jockeying for position. In
the world of pharmaceutical litigation, this means fighting, and
fighting hard, for the ideal federal court venue. Merck wanted the
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland to hear all federal
Vioxx cases.9 Plaintiffs' attorneys preferred trying the cases in the
District Court for the Southern District of Texas located in Houston. °
In January 2005, a multidistrict litigation panel of federal judges
selected District Judge Eldon E. Fallon of the Eastern District of
Louisiana to oversee the thousands of federal claims." The venue
decision is a clear victory for the plaintiffs' attorneys.12
5. Barnaby J. Feder, Vioxx Recall May Bring Flood of Suits to Merck, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2004, at C2.
6. Richard Stewart & Ruth Rendon, Vioxx Jury Awards Widow $253 Million, Hous.
CHRON., Aug. 20, 2005, at C1 (noting that because of Texas' statutory cap on punitive
damages, the court will likely remit the award to $26.1 million).
7. See Barbara Martinez, Vioxx Plaintiffs Want to Fight on New Front, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 24, 2005, at B1 (stating that as of the date of the article there were 3,400 state and
2,300 federal Vioxx cases pending across the country).
8. Barbara Martinez, Lawyer Outlines Attack on Merck for Vioxx Trial, WALL ST. J.,
June 24, 2005, at B1. In fact, $20 billion could be a rather conservative figure. As
Professor Richard Epstein notes in an open letter to the jurors from the first trial, "[rlight
now there are over 4,000 law suits against Merck for Vioxx. If each clocks in at $25
million, then your verdict is that the social harm from Vioxx exceeds $100 billion, before
thousands more join in the treasure hunt." Richard A. Epstein, Editorial, Ambush in
Angleton, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22,2005, at A10.
9. Barbara Martinez, Preparing for Vioxx Suits, Both Sides Seek Friendly Venues,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2004, at B1. Merck's pleadings contend that Maryland is the ideal
location for the trials because of the court's experience in past consolidated products
liability cases and because of the courthouse's location near major airports and large
hotels. Id. Of course, Maryland is also a part of the Fourth Circuit, often considered the
most conservative federal circuit in the country. Id.
10. Id. South Texas is known for large jury awards, most prominently a $1 billion
verdict against drugmaker Wyeth in April 2004. Id.
11. Michael Perlstein, All Vioxx Lawsuits to Be Heard in New Orleans, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 17, 2005, at 1, available at LEXIS, News & Business File.
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the multidistrict litigation oversight was temporarily
moved to Houston. See Martinez, supra note 7.
12. Perlstein, supra note 11.
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It is natural that both the plaintiff and defendant in any personal
injury case will want the case heard in a location where the judge and
jury will be most sympathetic to his or her plight. 3 In recent years,
however, the stakes in these battles over pharmaceutical litigation
venue have risen significantly for one key reason: the relative ease
with which a plaintiff may establish his or her right to an award for
punitive damages.14 Punitive damage award amounts are also
increasing: the average award doubled from $3.3 million to $7.6
million between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. 15 As a result,
punitive damages, historically a common law doctrine, are
increasingly fodder for legislative debate.16 Some states, with varying
degrees of strictness, are adopting provisions limiting either the
amount that a plaintiff may receive in punitive damages or the burden
a plaintiff must meet in demonstrating his or her entitlement to such
an award.17
Among the states enacting legislation regarding punitive
damages, some have singled out litigation over an injury caused by an
allegedly defective product,18 or even pharmaceutical litigation
13. In fact, plaintiffs' attorneys commonly seek out specific south Texas counties as
venues where judges are considered more sympathetic and juries are considered more
generous. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-
Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508 n.1 (1995) (citing impoverished, predominantly
Hispanic, and largely uneducated Duval and Maverick counties as particularly popular
among the plaintiffs' bar).
14. See Briggs L. Tobin, Comment, The "Limited Generosity" Class Action and a
Uniform Choice of Law Rule: An Approach to Fair and Effective Mass-Tort Punitive
Damage Adjudication in the Federal Courts, 38 EMORY L.J. 457, 480 (1989) ("[A] plaintiff
class has an incentive to shop for the forum where most members of the class may take
advantage of the most liberal punitive damage rule.").
15. Saundra Torry, Juries in 1990s Reluctant To Make Punitive Awards; Average
Award Has Doubled, Study Finds, WASH. POST, June 17, 1997, at A3.
16. See, e.g., James Bradshaw, Ohio Tort Reform Unlikely To Solve Pain-vs.-Gain
Judgment Dilemma, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Jan. 23, 1997, at 7A, available at
LEXIS, News & Business File (criticizing Ohio's newly passed tort reform bill which,
among other provisions, limits punitive damage awards); Sue Anne Pressley, Texans Draw
Line in Sand on Lawsuits; New Gov. Bush Declares Emergency on the Tort Reform Issue
Due on Hill Soon, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1995, at A3 (citing new Texas bill capping
punitive damages that passed the state Senate after heated debate); Eckert Sager, Punitive
Damages Bill Faces Maryland Vote, J. OF COM., Mar. 24, 1992, at 9A, available at LEXIS
(explaining a proposed state punitive damages reform statute).
17. See infra notes 29-33, 37 and accompanying text (citing statutes in force in
Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, and Virginia).
18. See infra notes 48-49 (referencing legislation passed in Arizona, Illinois, Indiana,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah).
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specifically,19 as deserving special treatment. These states recognize
these types of products liability cases as a unique breed of litigation,
partly due to a plaintiff's ability to assert a claim on a theory of strict
liability." In an ordinary personal injury case, such as a claim arising
from an automobile accident, proving entitlement to punitive
damages requires some showing of fault on behalf of the defendant.21
Only nine jurisdictions, however, have enacted legislation specifically
tying the availability of punitive damages against a pharmaceutical
manufacturer to the process the pharmaceutical manufacturer
undergoes to gain the required Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") approval to market its drug in the United States.2
This Comment argues that because the standards required by the
FDA are stringent enough to preempt even the most liberal
statement of punitive damages entitlement, states should not subject
pharmaceutical manufacturers to large punitive awards if they have
obtained FDA approval in good faith. 3 Following a survey of state
punitive damages law, federal constitutional constraints, the purposes
of punitive damage awards, and the steps a pharmaceutical
manufacturer must take to achieve FDA approval, this Comment
concludes that punitive damages are irrational in pharmaceutical
cases premised on defective design or failure-to-warn theories when
the drug at issue achieved good-faith FDA approval.
19. See infra note 49 (citing the laws of Arizona, Illinois, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, and Utah).
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998) (stating
that any entity "who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm
to persons or property caused by the defect," regardless of intent or knowledge).
21. See generally Ellen Wertheimer, Punitive Damages and Strict Products Liability:
An Essay in Oxymoron, 39 VILL. L. REv. 505, 508-10 (1994) (noting that the law
developed the strict liability doctrine to ensure that injured persons would be
compensated without making out a prima facie case of negligence because of lack of
access to pertinent information regarding the manufacture of the product). This
Comment argues that strict liability should cut against allowing a plaintiff suing under the
doctrine to seek punitive damages, which are ordinarily appropriate only if a plaintiff can
show more than ordinary negligence. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908(2) cmt. b (1965) (asserting that punitive damages are inappropriate when a
defendant's conduct constitutes nothing more than "ordinary negligence," such as "mere
inadvertence, mistake, [or] errors of judgment").
22. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (outlining the laws enacted in
Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah, all of
which adhere to this approach, with varying standards of the presumptive nature of FDA
approval to the manufacturer's level of culpability).
23. "Good faith" in this context means compliance with all FDA requirements
regarding testing, monitoring, and disclosure, as well as the absence of knowing
misstatements, fraud, or material omissions on the part of the pharmaceutical
manufacturer.
[Vol. 84740
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I. SURVEY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AMONG JURISDICTIONS
The availability of punitive damages to plaintiffs injured by
defective products varies significantly from state to state. Four states
erect an absolute bar to punitive damages through either
constitutional provision24 or legislative enactment." At the other end
of the spectrum, a number of states leave it to the courts to approve
an award of punitive damages according to common law standards.
The courts in a majority of these states award punitive damages only
upon the plaintiff's proving the defendant acted maliciously or
intentionally.26 The courts in the remainder of these states award
24. Punitive damages are constitutionally prohibited by article I, section 3 and article
VII, section 5 of the Nebraska Constitution. See, e.g., Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684,
688 (Neb. 1960) ("It has been a fundamental rule of law in [Nebraska] that punitive,
vindictive, or exemplary damages will not be allowed, and that the measure of recovery in
all civil cases is compensation for the injury sustained."); see also id. at 693 (Wenke, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe Constitution of Nebraska does not permit the recovery of punitive,
vindictive, or exemplary damages by individuals in civil cases.").
25. The states barring punitive damages by statute are Louisiana, Massachusetts, and
New Hampshire. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315(B) (2004) (prohibiting the award of
punitive damages unless specifically authorized by statute); id. ("Damages do not include
costs ... unless such treatment, services, surveillance, or procedures of any kind are
directly related to a manifest physical or mental injury or disease."); id. art. 2545 (making
product sellers liable for return price with interest, reasonable expenses occasioned by
sale, and attorneys fees, but not for deterrence or retribution); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 106, § 1-106 (West 2005) ("[N]either consequential or special nor penal damages may
be had except as specifically provided."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (Lexis 2004)
(prohibiting punitive damages unless expressly prescribed by statute).
26. See Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. McNeill Trucking Co., 828 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Ark.
1992) (affirming the trial court's denial of punitive damages and stating that "negligence,
however gross, will not justify an award of punitive damages"); Arrow Int'l v. Sparks, 98
S.W.3d 48, 57 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming $4 million punitive damage award against a
manufacturer where the evidence showed the manufacturer was aware of reported injuries
and deaths involving its product but continued to manufacture and sell the product
without providing adequate or timely warnings); Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d
1273, 1277-78 (Haw. 1992) (affirming dismissal of a claim for punitive damages based
upon the pacemaker manufacturer's bad-faith conduct during the course of settlement
negotiations, holding that the malicious conduct must be connected with the manufacture
and marketing of the injury-causing product); Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566,
573-74 (Haw. 1989) (remanding case for a reevaluation of a proper punitive damage
award after the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury that an award could be justified
based on a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and convincing evidence);
Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1360-62 (Me. 1985) (vacating award of punitive
damages because defendant's reckless actions were not accompanied by the requisite
malicious conduct); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Hayward, 464 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Me. 1983)
(affirming a denial of punitive damages because such an award would not provide a
deterrent effect over and above the three-year prison sentence received by defendant on
related criminal charges); Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 710 A.2d 267, 276-77 (Md. 1998)
(requiring actual knowledge on the part of a manufacturer of a defect in its product to
justify punitive damages); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 682 A.2d 1143,
1162-63 (Md. 1996) (reversing punitive damage award in asbestos case where there was
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84
punitive damages under common law standards ranging from a
defendant's knowledge and disregard of a conscious risk27 to conduct
indicating a reckless indifference to the interests of others.28
insufficient evidence of defendant's malice under a clear and convincing evidentiary
standard); Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 899 P.2d 576, 589-91 (N.M. 1995) (affirming award
of punitive damages against a medical device manufacturer where evidence showed the
manufacturer had actual notice of injuries involving its devices yet continued promoting
the use of its product without providing any warnings to the medical community); Zarrella
v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 824 A.2d 1249, 1262 (R.I. 2003) (affirming dismissal of claim
for punitive damages upon jury finding that defendant did not act willfully, recklessly, or
wickedly); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992) (remanding for
reconsideration of punitive damages consistent with state common-law rule requiring a
finding by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted intentionally,
fraudulently, maliciously, or recklessly); Huckeby v. Spangler, 563 S.W.2d 555, 558-59
(Tenn. 1978) (affirming court of appeal's ruling vacating a punitive damages award upon
concluding the award would not have a deterrent effect); Bolsta v. Johnson, 848 A.2d 306,
308 (Vt. 2004) (affirming the trial court's refusal to grant punitive damages against a drunk
driver and stating that "willful violation of the law is insufficient evidence of malice");
Mead v. W. Slate, Inc., 848 A.2d 257, 264 (Vt. 2004) (holding that punitive damages are
improper where the evidence fails to demonstrate a "knowing and willful disregard of
risks that made injury to plaintiff a substantial certainty"); Pion v. Bean, 833 A.2d 1248,
1259 (Vt. 2003) (affirming an award of punitive damages based on "'overwhelming'
evidence that plaintiffs acted with malice"); Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557, 560-61
(W. Va. 1992) (affirming punitive damages award against asbestos manufacturer acting
with actual knowledge of the serious health risks of asbestos and refusing to follow
suggested guidelines to ameliorate the risks to workers and consumers); Garnes v. Fleming
Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 904-05 (W. Va. 1991) (remanding the issue of punitive
damages to the trial court with the instruction that any such award "should bear a
reasonable relationship to the potential of harm caused by defendant's actions").
Michigan common law prohibits punitive damages as a means to sanction
defendants, but "exemplary" damages are proper for compensation purposes when a
plaintiff suffers humiliation, outrage, or indignity as a result of a defendant's malicious or
reckless actions. Michigan courts, however, construe this standard strictly. See, e.g.,
Jackovich v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 458, 464 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that the trial court properly refrained from giving a jury instruction on plaintiff's
request for punitive damages to punish the defendant because such an instruction was not
recognized in the state); Birkenshaw v. City of Detroit, 313 N.W.2d 334, 339 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1981) (reversing an exemplary damage award upon concluding that the award
actually constituted punitive damages intending to punish the defendant).
27. See Cloroben Chem. Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887, 891-92 (Del. 1983)
(affirming an award of punitive damages based upon evidence that defendant
manufacturer was "aware that its product and package were unsafe yet continued to
package it in the same manner"); Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 731 P.2d 1267, 1275-76
(Idaho 1986) (affirming an award of punitive damages against a bottle manufacturer upon
finding evidence that the defendant corporation's conduct was an "extreme deviation"
from the norm, and that it knew of many accidents similar to plaintiff's but nonetheless
failed to warn consumers); Morrison v. Quality Produce, Inc., 444 P.2d 409, 411 (Idaho
1968) (holding that it was error to submit an instruction on punitive damages to the jury
when the evidence did not show that the distributer "acted maliciously, fraudulently or
with gross negligence").
28. See Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. 1963) (holding that
"punitive damages are awarded only for outrageous conduct, that is, for acts done with a
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Other states have codified statutory standards for the level of
culpability that can expose a defendant to punitive damages. The
overwhelming majority of states adopting this legislative approach
award punitive damages only when a defendant's conduct is either
malicious 29 or willful and wanton.3" The courts in these states place
no strict cap on the amount of punitive damages available to a
plaintiff (though they may require that punitive damages bear a
"reasonable relationship" to compensatory damages) and do not, as a
matter of law, hold that a manufacturer's approval from any federal
bad motive or with a reckless indifference to the interests of others"); McDaniel v. Merck,
Sharp & Dohme, 533 A.2d 436, 448 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that the trial court erred
in denying claims for punitive damages against a drug manufacturer when the plaintiff
demonstrated defendant's culpable state of mind in failing to notify the medical
community of a serious risk of its marketed antibiotic); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d
37, 54 (Wis. 1984) (holding that plaintiff could not seek punitive damages from a DES
manufacturer when plaintiff's own physician testified that he did not rely on any of
defendant's allegedly fraudulent statements in prescribing the drug); Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 442 (Wis. 1980) (rejecting Ford Motor Company's contention
that a plaintiff seeking punitive damages must demonstrate the defendant's intentional
desire to injure). Other standards do not lend themselves to generalization. New York,
for example, awards punitive damages in only those products liability cases involving
either a willful failure to warn or a strict liability action. See, e.g., Lugo v. IAN Toys, Ltd.,
146 A.D.2d 168, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (reversing an award of punitive damages
against a toy manufacturer absent evidence of the manufacturer's wrongful motive, willful
intent to injure, or reckless indifference); Anderson v. Fortune Brands, Inc., 723 N.Y.S.2d
304, 307-08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding that a cause of action premised upon the willful
failure of the manufacturer to warn consumers of product dangers is an appropriate
vehicle for the assessment of punitive damages). Wyoming permits punitive damages only
when the defendant's conduct involves "some element of outrage similar to that usually
found in crime." Sheridan Commercial Park, Inc. v. Briggs, 848 P.2d 811, 817 (Wyo. 1993);
see also Alexander v. Meduna, 47 P.3d 206, 219-20 (Wyo. 2002) (affirming an award of
punitive damages based on the level of profitability enjoyed by the defendant as a result of
its fraud and deceit); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1052 (Wyo. 1998)
(reversing an award of punitive damages as disproportionate to defendant's level of
reprehensibility).
29. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b) (2004) (outrageous conduct exemplified by
malice, bad motive, or reckless indifference to the safety of others); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3294(a) (West 2005) (oppression, fraud, or malice); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-
102(1)(a) (West 2004) (fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 42.005(1) (West 2003) (oppression, fraud, or malice); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1D-
15(a) (West 2005) (fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 21-1-4.1 (2004) (malicious or willful and wanton conduct).
30. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(1)(a) (West 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-135
(2004). Note, however, that in products liability cases in South Carolina punitive damages
are unavailable when the cause of action is based solely upon a theory of strict liability.
Barnwell v. Barber-Colman Co., 393 S.E.2d 162, 163-64 (S.C. 1989) (per curiam). The
remaining states whose legislatures adopted statutory standards utilize slight variations on
the level of culpability required before punitive damages are recoverable. See KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2) (West 2004) (oppression, fraud, or malice); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 549.20(1)(a)-(b) (West 2005) (deliberate disregard for the rights and safety of others).
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agency or compliance with statutory law shields the manufacturer
from punitive damage liability.
A. Statutory Standards
While punitive damages are traditionally a creature of the
common law, an increasing number of states are opting to statutorily
restrain such awards through a variety of mechanisms. These
mechanisms either curtail the amount a court may award or limit the
amount the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney, or both may collect.
States employ different types of statutes that cap punitive damages
with each type of statute reflecting different concerns. The traditional
cap limits an award to a fixed monetary sum and is now seldom
employed.3 The majority of states using cap legislation today employ
statutes linking the upper limit of punitive damages directly to the
compensatory damages award in the case, allowing a punitive award
equal to either double32 or triple33 the award of actual damages. This
approach, endorsed by the American Law Institute34 and the
31. Virginia is now the only state currently using this strict statutory scheme, capping
any one plaintiff's non-compensatory damages at $350,000. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1
(West 2004).
32. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b (2003) (limiting punitive damage awards in
products liability cases to two times an award of actual damages). The Texas legislature
recently enacted a statutory cap on punitive damage awards, limiting them to the greater
of $200,000 or two times the compensatory damages plus noneconomic damages, up to
$750,000. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (Vernon 2004). Note, however,
that in Texas, the extremely low standard of gross negligence can justify an award of
punitive damages so long as the purpose of the award is to punish the defendant's morally
culpable conduct and not to enrich the plaintiff. See generally Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 934 S.W.2d 439
(Tex. App. 1996). This cap did not apply in the groundbreaking April 27, 2004 verdict
against pharmaceutical giant Wyeth because the jury found that the conduct of the
drugmaker violated the Texas Penal Code. Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Record-Setting $1
Billion Verdict Returned in Fen-Phen Suit, May 3, 2004, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?
id=1083328797998.
33. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(2) (2004) (excepting actions for wrongful death and
class actions, punitive damage awards in personal injury actions are limited to the greater
of three times the compensatory damage award or $1.5 million); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-
1115.05(a) (2003) (limiting punitive damage awards to three times the compensatory
daiaage award); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(b) (2004) (limiting punitive damage awards to
$250,000 or three times compensatory damages, whichever is larger; if a jury returns a
verdict for punitive damages in excess of the statutory cap, the trial judge has the
obligation to reduce the award to comply with the law).
34. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY: REPORTERS' STUDY 256-59 (1991) (proposing that state legislatures and courts
establish a required numerical ratio between compensatory and punitive damages, but
declining to recommend a specific ratio).
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American College of Trial Lawyers,35 provides courts and juries clear
guidance by which to assess a proper award. Both the American Law
Institute and the American College of Trial Lawyers suggest limiting
damages to the greater of either a multiple of the compensatory
damages awarded or a fixed sum, reasoning that such an approach
provides consistency while equipping "the trier of fact with great
flexibility to do justice in the rare situation where a defendant has
engaged in heinous conduct with a huge potential for harm, but which
resulted in little actual harm."36
As the name suggests, punitive damages are indeed intended to
punish defendants. A number of states capping punitive damages
recognize this fact while realizing that the monetary amount of any
particular award will affect different defendants in different ways. A
handful of states therefore tie statutory caps to a defendant's wealth,
often limiting damages to a percentage of the individual defendant's
net worth or annual income.37 Commentators have long suggested
that this approach to punitive caps most aptly accomplishes the
primary goals of punitive damages-punishment and deterrence-in
a way that traditional caps do not.38 Other states seeking to achieve
these goals without necessarily considering the solvency of a
defendant choose not to adopt general caps applicable in all cases, but
35. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF
THE COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 15
(1989) (recommending that any statutory punitive damages limit be restricted by
relationship to compensatory damages).
36. Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform: State
Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1365, 1379 (1993).
37. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (1994) (limiting punitive damage awards to
defendant's annual gross income or $5 million, whichever is less); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-
1-65 (West 1999) (limiting punitive damage awards according to the net worth of the
defendant); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220 (2003) (limiting punitive damage awards in
products liability cases to $10 million or 3% of the defendant's net worth, whichever is
less).
38. See, e.g., Debra Dison Hall, Pretrial Discovery of Net Worth in Punitive Damages
Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1144-45 (1981) ("[A]n award of punitive damages must
take into account two factors: the outrageousness or maliciousness of the defendant's
conduct, and his ability to pay."); Walter Lucas, Punitives Cap Makes Injury a Cost of
Doing Business, 138 N.J. L.J., 789, 804 (1994) (arguing that the "best yardstick" for
accomplishing the deterrent goal of punitive damages is consideration of the net worth of
the defendant, and that a generally applicable cap on punitive damages limits courts'
abilities to accomplish this goal); Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1191 (1931) ("[A] penalty which would be sufficient to reform a poor
man is likely to make little impression on a rich one; and therefore the richer the
defendant is the larger the punitive damage award should be.").
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instead have enacted statutes varying the quantitative cap in relation
to the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.39
The small number of states opting to limit punitive damages
through statutory caps reflects the divergent opinions and ongoing
debate about these caps' fairness and efficacy. Proponents argue that
strict limits are beneficial because they place defendants on notice as
to the extent of their potential liability."n Critics respond that these
caps are superficial and arbitrary.4' These critics argue further that
since any cap must be high enough to effectively deter wrongful
conduct, regardless of the defendant's wealth, a meaningful cap
would need to be virtually limitless anyway.42
Other states pursuing the punishment and deterrence goals of
punitive damages limit the portion of the award that any one plaintiff
or plaintiff's attorney may receive rather than implementing a general
cap on such awards. Legislatures in at least four of the states
adopting this approach limit the plaintiff's recovery to a percentage of
any punitive award, and several have established a fund into which
the balance of the award must be paid.43 Oregon actually limits the
39. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West
2004); see also Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 363 n.114 (Okla. 1993) (stating that
before beginning the inquiry into the amount of appropriate damages the plaintiff must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has acted with intent, with
malice, or with reckless disregard for the rights of others). A final approach to a statutory
cap, currently in force only in the state of Washington, places an upper limit on punitive
damages according to a formula that takes into account the injured plaintiff's average
annual wage and life expectancy. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (West 2004). While
the Supreme Court of Washington held that an application of this provision may be
unconstitutional, see Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 723 (Wash. 1989), the statute
remains on the books.
40. See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (discussing BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)). In BMW, the United States Supreme Court noted that
statutory caps were critical to providing defendants "fair notice" as to the type of conduct
that may give rise to punitive damages awards and the extent of any potential punishment.
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574 ("Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will
subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose.").
41. Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through National Punitive
Damage Reform, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1573, 1622-23 (1997).
42. Id. at 1623-24.
43. These states include Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, and Oregon. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2000) (requiring 75% of the recovery of any punitive damages
award be paid into the state treasury account instead of to the plaintiff); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-51-3-6 (West 1998) (entitling plaintiff to the full amount of compensatory damages
awarded but requiring any punitive damages to be paid by the defendant to the clerk of
court, who then pays 25% of the recovered amount to the plaintiff and deposits the other
75% with the state treasurer's violent crime victim compensation fund); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.675 (West 2000) (requiring 50% of any punitive damage award to be deposited into
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portion of the award a plaintiff's attorney may receive.44 Moreover,
some of these states allow a defendant to credit the amount paid in
punitive damages in previous cases regarding the same conduct
towards new awards against the defendant.45 The theory underlying
this scheme is the familiar adage that punitive damages are meant to
punish the defendant, not enrich any plaintiff.46 The constitutionality
of statutory caps has been repeatedly attacked and upheld, based on
the reasoning that because a legislature has the power to abolish
punitive damages entirely, as the legislatures in some states have
done, then the legislature necessarily has the power to limit non-
compensatory damages.47
A few state statutes codify the idea that a manufacturer
complying with federal statutory or regulatory standards cannot be
held liable for punitive damages, absent a showing of bad faith or
fraudulent misrepresentation by the manufacturer to the regulatory
body. In the context of the pharmaceutical industry, these statutory
provisions range materially in breadth and significance. A relatively
favorable plaintiff's forum may have a rebuttable presumption against
a drug's defectiveness and the manufacturer's bad-faith conduct or
negligence if the injury-causing drug received FDA approval.48 States
the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund instead of being paid to the plaintiff); OR. REV.
STAT. § 18.540(1) (1997) (permitting Oregon plaintiffs to recover only 40% of any punitive
damage award).
44. Out of the 40% of an award available to the plaintiff in Oregon, see supra note 43,
the plaintiff's attorney may not receive more than 50% of the plaintiff's award or 20% of
the entire award. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.540(1) (West 2003).
45. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (granting only one award of punitive
damages for any single act or omission regardless of how many causes of action arise
thereunder or how many plaintiffs sustain injury thereby); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263
(West 2004) (crediting defendants with amounts previously paid for punitive damages in
other cases arising out of the same conduct).
46. See Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981) ("Punitive
damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to
punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious ....").
47. See, e.g., Hemmings v. Tydyman's Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002)
(reversing determination that plaintiffs were not entitled to punitive damages but
upholding the constitutional validity of the federal statutory cap applying to actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 651 N.W.2d, 437, 442 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2002) (reversing entry of a judgment in excess of the statutory cap); Rhyne v. K-Mart
Corp., 149 N.C. App. 672, 675, 562 S.E.2d 82, 86 (2002) (affirming the trial court's
reduction of a punitive damage award to $250,000 per plaintiff from a jury verdict of $11.5
million pursuant to state statutory cap).
48. For instance, Indiana places a presumption against punitive damages in products
liability cases where the injury-causing product complied with governmental standards.
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-5-1 (LexisNexis 1998) (stating that upon a showing of
compliance, there is "a rebuttable presumption that the product that caused the physical
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more sympathetic to drug manufacturers have adopted outright rules
against such awards unless the plaintiff shows that the manufacturer
knowingly withheld information from or misled the FDA in gaining
approval to market the drug.49 The legislatures in these states
recognize the time and expertise involved in the FDA approval
process and appreciate that the public interest in the availability of
affordable prescription drugs is best served by limiting the extent of
manufacturer liability when injury results from an approved
pharmaceutical. 5°  This approach represents a state legislature's
determination that courts should not ignore the expert regulatory
process and continually reevaluate a drug's risks based on a judge or
jury's own lay standards.5'
B. Constitutional Constraints
State statutory and case law are significant sources of the
increasing number of limits on the availability of punitive damages,
but they are not the only sources. Punitive awards also invoke
constitutional considerations. Defendants argue that if punitive
damages truly aim to serve the purpose of punishment, constitutional
due process protections ensure certain procedural and substantive
safeguards.52 Given that punishment is traditionally a remedy of
criminal law, not the civil tort system, defendants may contend that
simple civil process is inadequate to protect the interests at stake. 3
Most of these arguments have been unsuccessful. For example, the
Supreme Court held in United States v. Halper"4 that the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition on double jeopardy5 does not prevent a
single defendant from incurring liability for punitive damages in more
harm was not defective and that the manufacturer or seller of the product was not
negligent").
49. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701(A)(1), (B) (2003); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-2107 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 2000); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-03.2-11(6) (1996); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C)(1)(a) (West 2005);
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927(1)(a) (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (2002).
50. See, e.g., Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 97 (Utah 1991) (evaluating the
Utah legislature's reasons for adopting its statute).
51. Id.
52. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (1986).
53. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194 (1991)
("Characteristically, tort law prices, while criminal law prohibits.").
54. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. V (declaring that no person may "be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb").
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than one case arising out of the same conduct. 6 Furthermore, in
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,57
the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment 8 does not apply to punitive damages awarded in civil
cases between private parties.5 9
While refusing to find outright constitutional prohibitions on
punitive damages, the Court has nonetheless articulated some
governing limitation principles. 6 Procedural due process limitations,
for example, may restrict a state's ability to impose its own punitive
damages law upon a defendant. In Honda Motor Company Ltd. v.
Oberg,61 the Court struck down an Oregon state court punitive
damages award based on constitutional concerns.6' Oregon law
precluded an appellate court from reviewing the amount of a punitive
damages award, permitting the court to only consider whether any
punitive award was appropriate.63 Once the appellate court found
evidence supporting a punitive award, generally, state law required
the reviewing court to uphold the jury's award in its entirety.64 The
United States Supreme Court held that Oregon's law failed to
56. Halper, 490 U.S. at 450 (rejecting a double jeopardy argument and affirming $6
million jury verdict for the plaintiff in an antitrust suit).
57. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
59. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260 (holding that the clause likely applies only to
criminal cases, and certainly does not apply to civil cases between private parties in which
no governmental interests are implicated). The Court left open, however, the "materially
different" question of whether the Eighth Amendment is implicated in qui tam actions, "in
which a private party brings suit in the name of the United States and shares in any award
of damages." Id. at 275 n.21. The Court also chose not to address the constitutionality of
state statutes requiring a portion of punitive damage awards to be paid into a state fund
rather than being awarded to the plaintiff. See, e.g., statutes of Georgia, Indiana, Missouri,
and Oregon, supra note 43 and accompanying text. There may be a corollary to the
"materially different" qui tam argument that Eighth Amendment limitations should apply
because these state governments benefit from the imposition of punitive damage awards.
To date, the Court has not addressed this question.
60. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating More-Than-Whole Damages in
Personal Injury Law: Deterrence and Punishment, 71 TENN. L. REV. 117, 118 (2003) ("[I]n
recent years the United States Supreme Court has twice held that awards of punitive
damages were so grossly excessive that they violated the defendant's substantive due
process rights, and has twice held that the procedure under which punitive damages were
awarded violated the defendant's procedural due process rights.").
61. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
62. The state court jury awarded $5 million in punitive damages against Honda in a
products liability action. Id. at 418.
63. Id. at 426-27 ("[I]f the defendant's only basis for relief is the amount of punitive
damages the jury awarded, Oregon provides no procedure for reducing or setting aside
that award.").
64. Id.
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provide adequate appellate review under the Federal Constitution's
procedural due process requirements.65
While compensatory damages generally serve to redress the loss
caused to a plaintiff by a defendant's actions, "punitive damages serve
a broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and retribution."'
In evaluating the appropriateness of a punitive damage award, then,
the question of reasonableness must be directly correlated with the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.67 The Supreme
Court thus recognizes that substantive due process concerns are also
implicated when punitive damages are imposed upon a defendant
and, as a result, holds that such awards may not be "grossly
excessive."68 To aid lower courts in complying with this requirement,
the Court developed a three-prong test for use in determining
whether a given award comports with substantive due process
standards. The criteria requiring consideration include "(1) the
degree or reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct, (2) the
disparity between the harm ... suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award, and (3) the difference between the punitive
damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases."" The test is premised on the
65. Id. at 432. ("Oregon's denial of judicial review of the size of the punitive damage
awards violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
66. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
67. See id. at 419 ("[P]unitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant's
culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the
imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence."); see also Pac. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1991) (holding that the Federal Constitution
imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards).
68. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 434 (2001). The Court
articulated a similarly critical principle in Cooper Industries: A federal appellate court
reviewing a punitive damage award from a district court should evaluate the excessiveness
of the award de novo, granting no presumption of appropriateness to the district court's
assessment. Id. at 436. The Court reasoned that because the "excessiveness inquiry"
requires evaluation of constitutional standards, an appellate court is reviewing a question
of law rather than a question of fact making de novo review appropriate. Id. at 435-36.
69. Id. at 440 (citing BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996)). The
Court recently expanded the definition of "reprehensibility," stating that analysis of this
first prong requires consideration of whether
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct
evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;
the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated
actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419. The absence of any one of these factors, the Court concluded,
may not necessitate reversing a punitive damage award, but a judgment resting on less
than all three would be "suspect." Id.
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requirement of the Due Process Clause that a state provide a
defendant adequate notice not only of the types of conduct that might
subject him to liability for punitive damages, but also the possible
severity of the penalty that may be imposed for that conduct.70
The substantive due process consideration figured prominently
in the Court's decision to strike down a multimillion dollar state court
award in BMW of North America v. Gore.71 The plaintiff discovered
that his new car had been damaged and repainted at the defendant's
out-of-state factory prior to its delivery to the Alabama dealership at
which the plaintiff purchased the vehicle. 72 The plaintiff contended
that BMW's failure to disclose the repair constituted a material
omission for which he deserved compensation.73 The jury agreed and
awarded the plaintiff $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million
in punitive damages. 74 The Supreme Court of Alabama remitted the
punitive damages award to $2 million75 but the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the sum was still impermissibly high
under the Fourteenth Amendment.76 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, explained the constitutional significance of the state court's
punitive award: "Alabama does not have the power ... to punish
BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had no
impact on Alabama or its residents.
77
Applying the first prong of the test articulated in Cooper
Industries, the BMW Court held that because the repair and
subsequent nondisclosure were lawful in the state in which the car
was manufactured and repainted, and because the injury to the
plaintiff was purely economic, the defendant's conduct could not be
considered particularly reprehensible. 7  The Court then noted the
significant 500:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages
awarded by the trial court as enough to "raise a suspicious judicial
eyebrow" under the second prong of its analysis.79 Finally, applying
70. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574.
71. See id. at 559.
72. Id. at 562 & n.1.
73. Id. at 563.
74. Id. at 565.
75. Id. at 567.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 572-73.
78. Id. at 575-80.
79. Id. at 583. The Court declined to specify a ratio that may have been appropriate.
Later, however, the Court cited BMW in striking down a $145 million state court punitive
award in State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). In State
Farm, the Utah Supreme Court had remitted a compensatory damage award for fraud and
intentional infliction of emotional distress from $2.6 million to $1 million but sustained the
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the third prong of its test, the Court reasoned that in other states,
awards against defendants based on similar conduct had not exceeded
several thousand dollars, so BMW could not have been on adequate
notice that it could be subject to a multi-million dollar verdict.8'
Underlying this constitutional framework is the twofold purpose
of punitive damages: punishment and deterrence.81  These stated
objectives suggest an inherent requirement that defendants deserve
punishment for knowingly wrongful conduct and that the imposition
of a punitive award will deter the defendant from engaging in similar
wrongful conduct in the future. Against this backdrop, an
examination of the FDA's approval and regulatory practices will be
helpful in examining whether punitive damages assessed against a
pharmaceutical manufacturer that followed FDA guidelines, but
nevertheless produced an allegedly harmful drug, are warranted by
either of these goals.
II. ACHIEVING FDA APPROVAL
Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA") in 1938.82 Congress enacted the FDCA in response to a
public call for greater federal oversight of pharmaceuticals following
a number of deaths caused by Elixir-Sulfanilamide, a liquid form of a
drug used to treat streptococcal infections.83 The FDCA authorizes
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to require pre-market
testing of drugs and to oversee post-marketing conduct by
trial court's punitive damages figure. Id. at 415. The United States Supreme Court struck
down the 145:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. Id. at 425. In doing
so, the Court "decline[d] again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages
award cannot exceed," but noted that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages ... will satisfy due process." Id. The Court further
hinted that a 4:1 ratio may be the limit of constitutionality as far as substantive due process
is concerned. Id.
80. BMW, 517 U.S. at 584.
81. Id. at 568; see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991)
("[Ulnder the law of most States, punitive damages are imposed for purposes of
retribution and deterrence."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1965) (stating
that the purpose of punitive damages is "to punish [a defendant] for his outrageous
conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future").
82. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (2000)).
83. H.A. WALLACE, DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE ON DEATHS DUE TO ELIXIR-SULFANILAMIDE-MASSENGILL, S. DOC.
NO. 124, at 2 (1937); see also Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The
1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER MAG., June 1981, available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/ history/elixir.html.
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manufacturers."' The FDA has since adopted thousands of federal
regulations to accomplish these directives." Today, despite the
adoption of these regulations, the FDCA still provides the basic
framework for the steps a manufacturer must take to distribute a
pharmaceutical in the United States.86 FDA regulations, in turn,
predicate the drug's introduction into interstate commerce on the
agency's approval of the manufacturer's New Drug Application
("NDA"). 7 Thus, while the FDCA's language still outlines the steps
a manufacturer must take to market a drug in the United States, FDA
regulations essentially dictate whether it may be introduced in the
first place.
The long, arduous, and expensive process a pharmaceutical
manufacturer undergoes to receive FDA approval should raise
serious doubts about the ability of the manufacturer of an allegedly
harmful drug to act maliciously or even recklessly in making the drug
available to the public once the company submits all required
information to the FDA. The application process alone typically
takes two years to complete, and the testing that must take place
before the application process begins can take many times longer.88
In fact, the regulations imposed by the United States Food and Drug
Administration are generally considered the world's most
demanding.89
A new drug cannot be marketed in the United States without
receiving approval from the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research ("CDER"), which certifies not only that the drug is safe,
but that it is effective for its advertised intended use.90 Before even
84. 21 U.S.C. § 360e; id. § 3601; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 1 (1976) (authorizing
the FDA to require pre-market testing of pharmaceuticals and oversight of pre-market
conduct of drug companies).
85. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 200-300 (2005).
86. The Food and Drug Administration "shall promote the public health by promptly
and efficiently reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on the marketing
of regulated products," 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1), and specifically shall "protect the public
health by ensuring that human and veterinary drugs are safe and effective." Id.
§ 393(b)(2).
87. See MARK MATHIEU, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: A REGULATORY
OVERVIEW, 186 (5th ed. 2000).
88. See CHI-JEN LEE, DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF DRUGS: FROM
LABORATORY THROUGH LICENSURE TO MARKET 25 (1993) (describing public
misconception of the FDA's role in drug approval).
89. See MATHIEU, supra note 87, at 1.
90. See ELAINE WHITMORE, DEVELOPMENT OF FDA-REGULATED MEDICAL
PRODUCTS: PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, BIOLOGICS, AND MEDICAL DEVICES 44 (2004)
(discussing the pre-marketing approval process). More on the CDER can be found on its
official website. See http://www.fda.gov/cder/index.html.
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submitting an application for approval, however, a pharmaceutical
manufacturer must produce evidence of safety and effectiveness
through both preclinical research, in which the drug is tested in Petri
dishes and in animals, and three phases of clinical research involving
studies of the drug in humans.91 The FDA does not become involved
in the process until all preclinical testing is complete and the drug
company wishes to test the drug's safety and effectiveness in
humans.92
A drug manufacturer undertakes years of preliminary testing
before ever presenting a new drug to the FDA. Once a researcher
identifies a compound that may be effective in treating some
condition, a pharmaceutical company may decide to take on
preclinical in vitro and in vivo testing, representing the first major
step toward regulatory approval.93 Although the FDA does not
dictate the types of tests that must be conducted, extensive regulation
governs even these initial stages of the process.94 For example, a
nonclinical research laboratory-a laboratory that uses test subjects
other than humans-must have, among other attributes, educated and
experienced personnel,95 an independent quality assurance unit 96
staffed independently from this personnel,97 specific protocols,98 and
health and welfare standards for tested animals.9 9 Through testing,
researchers often find that tested compounds are unsafe, not readily
91. See RICHARD A. GUARINO, NEW DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS, at xix (1993).
92. Jeffrey P. Cohn, The Beginnings: Laboratory and Animal Studies, FDA
CONSUMER SPECIAL REPORT 4 (Jan. 1995), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/
whatwedo/testtube-3.pdf.
93. See MATHIEU, supra note 87, at 7-8. Preclinical testing includes any testing that
does not involve human test subjects. Id. at 5. In vitro testing involves observations of
how the compound reacts with other compounds in various non-living environments. See
RICK NG, DRUGS: FROM DISCOVERY TO APPROVAL 3 (2004). In vivo testing examines
the safety and efficacy of the compound on animal test subjects. Id.
94. See Cohn, supra note 92, at 4.
95. 21 C.F.R. § 58.29(a) (2005) ("Each individual engaged in the conduct of or
responsible for the supervision of a nonclinical laboratory study shall have education,
training, and experience, or combination thereof, to enable that individual to perform the
assigned functions.").
96. Id. § 58.35(a) ("A testing facility shall have a quality assurance unit which shall be
responsible for monitoring each study to assure management that the facilities, equipment,
personnel, methods, practices, records, and controls are in conformance with the
regulations in this part.").
97. Id. ("For any given study, the quality assurance unit shall be entirely separate
from and independent of the personnel engaged in the direction and conduct of that
study.").
98. See id. § 58.120-130 (regulating protocol and conduct of a nonclinical laboratory
study).
99. See id. § 58.90 (outlining required standard operating procedures for the housing,
feeding, handling, and care of animal test subjects).
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absorbed or metabolized, or contain some other defect that makes
them ineligible for further development. 10 In fact, those close to the
process estimate that only 1 out of every 1,000 drugs that enters the
nonclinical testing process ever progresses beyond this phase. 10 1 Of
the drugs qualifying for further testing, only 1 in 5 will ever be
marketed as a new product-1 in every 5,000 compounds that enters
initial nonclinical testing.102 Conducting a thorough nonclinical study
that adheres to FDA regulations represents a phase of research often
lasting over 6 years.0 3
For the approximately 0.1% of compounds that move from the
nonclinical phase to testing involving human subjects, FDA oversight
grows progressively more intense. Prior to beginning the three
phases of clinical studies involving humans, the FDA requires a
manufacturer to file an Investigational New Drug application
("IND")."°  The IND must contain information regarding the
chemical formulation of the new drug, results of in vivo animal
studies, the proposed design of the human study, a description of the
types. of patients to be studied, an outline of risk-minimizing
procedures, details involving how the drug will be administered, and
dosing information, among other data. 105 Unlike a New Drug
Application, which requests FDA approval to market the drug to the
public, there is no formal approval process; a drug manufacturer may
initiate clinical trials as proposed in an IND 30 days after the FDA
receives the application, so long as the FDA does not contact the
manufacturer within this 30-day period to tell the manufacturer
otherwise.0 6 The IND, then, is essentially a notice to the FDA that
the drug company intends to ship the yet-unapproved drug in
interstate commerce to test sites and proceed with clinical trials in
humans.107
Expensive and time consuming, pre-market clinical trials are
divided into three phases, with submission of a new IND required for
each phase.'08 At any stage of any phase, the FDA may step in and
100. MATHIEU, supra note 87, at 19.
101. Id.
102. WHITMORE, supra note 90, at 88.
103. Id. at 95.
104. MATHIEU, supra note 87, at 49.
105. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2005) (outlining the suggested contents of the Investigator's
Brochure that must be submitted with the IND).
106. MATHIEU, supra note 87, at 50. For more on the specific requirements of an
NDA, see infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
107. MATHIEU, supra note 87, at 49.
108. See GUARINO, supra note 91, at 41-42.
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halt a trial should any concerns over safety or protocol arise.0 9 Phase
I examines the general safety of the new drug and watches for
potential side effects on a very small scale, normally in trials involving
between 10 and 100 people. 10 Participants in Phase I trials may be
healthy volunteers or may be terminally ill patients who have opted
to try the new drug.' Even though Phase I clinical trials involve
comparatively small numbers of test subjects, such trials average a
year in length and commonly cost upwards of $10 million." 2
Phase II trials involve larger-scale testing of the drug on patients
who have the specific condition the drug is designed to treat."3
Normally, somewhere between 50 and 500 patients participate in
Phase 1I trials, which involve double-blind studies intended to
determine the effective dose of the drug and the ideal drug regimen,
in terms of both frequency and duration. 14 Phase II clinical trials,
due to their complexity and purpose, are even more costly and time-
consuming than Phase I trials, generally taking one to two years to
complete and costing the manufacturer about $20 million." 5 At the
end of Phase II testing, representatives from the pharmaceutical
manufacturer must meet with agents of the FDA to discuss any plans
to move on to Phase III trials.1'6 Only about 30% of the drugs that
enter clinical trials progress past Phase I and II testing.117
Phase III trials test a drug's safety and efficacy on a large patient
group and at a variety of sites, essentially representing a
geographically and numerically expanded version of a successful
Phase II trial." 8 Thousands of patients typically participate in Phase
III trials, and their treatment is followed for years in order to gauge
109. NG, supra note 93, at 181.
110. Id. at 144; see also § 312.21(a) ("These studies are designed to determine the
metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans, the side effects associated
with increasing doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness.").
111. NG, supra note 93, at 144.
112. Id.
113. WHITMORE, supra note 90, at 94; see also § 312.21(b) (stating that the purpose of
this phase is "to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or
indications in patients with the disease or condition under study and to determine the
common short-term side effects and risks associated with the drug").
114. NG, supra note 93, at 145.
115. Id.
116. LEE, supra note 88, at 67.
117. NG, supra note 93, at 145.
118. Id. at 146; see also § 312.21(c) (stating that Phase III testing is "intended to gather
the additional information about effectiveness and safety that is needed to evaluate the




long-term side effects and safety.119 The studies are double-blind and
randomized, ' 2  designed to provide detailed insights into the
effectiveness of the new drug as opposed to either placebos or the
most effective current treatment, or both.21 Phase III trials last from
three to five years and cost up to $100 million due to their
magnitude.22
All of the above steps-preclinical testing and Phase I through
III of clinical trials-may easily last fifteen years and cost a drug
company hundreds of millions of dollars. 123  The result is that only
one out of thousands of investigational compounds shows itself to be
safe and effective enough to justify submitting an application for
FDA approval to market the drug to the public.2 4  Even then, of
course, not all applications are approved. 25
A new drug's entrance into the formal FDA approval process
begins with a manufacturer submitting an NDA1 26 A proper NDA
must contain detailed technical information including the chemistry
of the compound, all components used in its manufacture, the
environmental impact of manufacturing procedures, toxicity
indicators, effects of the drug on reproduction or fetal development,
absorption and metabolic tendencies, methods used in all animal and
human studies and the results of such studies, any observed side
effects, summaries of risks and benefits, a statistical evaluation of
clinical data, and any other information related to the evaluated
safety and effectiveness of the drug. 127 A typical NDA can easily be
thousands of pages in length and must comply with dozens of FDA
guidelines. 28 In evaluating an NDA, the FDA seeks to resolve three
119. WHITMORE, supra note 90, at 94.
120. See § 314.126(b)(2)(i) ("A placebo-controlled study ... usually includes
randomization and blinding of patients or investigators, or both.").
121. WHITMORE, supra note 90, at 94.
122. NG, supra note 93, at 147.
123. For example, in 2004 alone, Pfizer's research and development expenses were
estimated at $7.68 billion. This figure does not account for the drugmaker's general and
administrative expenses, totalling almost $17 billion. Scott Hensley, Pfizer Plans $2
Billion in Cost Cuts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2005, at A3.
124. Only about 1 out of every 1,000 compounds progresses past preclincal testing. See
supra note 102 and accompanying text. Then, for every 100 drugs that enter clinical
testing, 70% progress from Phase I to Phase II, 33% from Phase II to Phase III, and only
25%-30% successfully complete Phase III. Ken Flieger, Testing Drugs in People, FDA
CONSUMER SPECIAL REPORT 4 tbl.1 (Jan. 1995), available at http://www.fda.gov/
cder/about/whatwedo/test tube-3a.pdf.
125. Flieger, supra note 124.
126. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b) (2000).
127. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2005); see also LEE, supra note 88, at 71-74.
128. MATHIEU, supra note 87, at 185,196-97.
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key considerations: (1) whether the drug is safe and effective for its
proposed use(s) and whether the benefits of the drug outweigh the
risks; (2) whether the drug's proposed labeling (package insert) is
appropriate and what additional information, if any, it should contain;
and (3) whether the methods used in manufacturing the drug and the
controls used to maintain the drug's quality are adequate to preserve
the drug's identity, strength, quality, and purity.'29
To evaluate these three considerations, the FDA compiles a
review team of chemists, pharmacologists, physicians, microbiologists,
and statisticians to evaluate each properly presented NDA, and often
consults with one of seventeen standing advisory committees on drugs
and biologics for advice. 3 ' From the time an NDA is submitted, it
takes an average of fifteen to twenty months for the FDA to make an
ultimate decision on whether to approve a new drug for marketing in
the United States.13' A grant of approval from the FDA affirms the
agency's view that the benefits of the drug outweigh any foreseeable
risk. It does not, however, ensure that a drug will have no adverse
side effects-in fact, "[t]here is no such thing as absolute safety in
drugs."'32 With side effects for some drug users an inevitable part of
even the most beneficial pharmaceuticals, the current standards for
reaping large punitive awards could apply to any manufacturer, for
any drug. Under the regime in some jurisdictions, then, all
pharmaceutical manufacturers are supposedly engaging in abhorrent
behavior.
In 1979, the FDA further strengthened its approval process
beyond the requirements imposed for submission of an NDA by
dictating the format of a drug's warning label and package insert with
the goal of ensuring proper use by consumers.'33 The labeling
regulations reflect the FDA's experience with the purposes and
effects of labeling, as well as the agency's recognition of its own
responsibility to ensure that each drug's label meets scientific and
regulatory requirements.1 " Drafting a prescription drug's package
insert begins with the pharmacology, toxicology, and safety data
included in the IND and NDA, as well as the data supplied by
129. Outline of the NDA Process, http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/
NDA.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
130. LEE, supra note 88, at 76.
131. WHITMORE, supra note 90, at 47. The fifteen-to-twenty-month wait, as of 2002, is
down from a high of thirty months in 1992. Id.
132. Drug Safety (Part I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental
Relations, 88th Cong. 147 (1964).
133. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56-.57 (2005).
134. GUARINO, supra note 91, at 362.
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premarket clinical and nonclinical trials.35 In general, the label of an
FDA-regulated drug must "contain a summary of the essential
scientific information needed for the safe and effective use of the
drug,... be informative and accurate and neither promotional in tone
nor false or misleading in any particular ... [and] be based whenever
possible on data derived from human experience.' ' 13 6 Although the
manufacturer will suggest the bulk of a label's substantive
information, the FDA has the final say on the contents of the
warning-most significantly, on which of the adverse indications are
included and how they are worded. 3 7 In fact, the FDA itself "has
stated clearly that its labeling decisions reflect conscious policy
choices not only about what information should be included in drug
labels, but also what information should not be included.'
138
The FDA also conducts extensive post-approval monitoring of
any drug that hits the U.S. market to ensure continuing safety and
efficacy. Pharmaceutical companies must closely monitor their drugs
and report to the FDA any adverse drug information they receive
from any source, through mandatory continuing research studies or
through reports from users and physicians.139 The FDCA reinforces
these reporting requirements with the threat of civil and criminal
penalties for any manufacturer who does not comply fully or who is
found to have deliberately concealed knowledge of adverse drug
reactions. 140 Significantly, the FDA itself feels its requirements are
stringent enough to mitigate the need for punitive liability. FDA
spokesman Jeff Pruitt, commenting on a recent House of
Representatives bill proposing limiting punitive damage awards
against manufacturers of FDA-approved drugs, stated the agency's
position clearly: "We believe that punitive damages should be
135. Id. The text of each prescription drug's package insert is also published in the
Physician's Desk Reference, the compendium of drug information relied upon by
prescribing medical professionals. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE (59th ed. 2005),
available at http://www.PDR.net.
136. § 201.56(a)-(c).
137. See Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the
Food and Drug Administration, 41 FooD & DRUG L.J. 233, 236 (1986) (stating that the
FDA "retains, as a practical matter, complete control over package inserts"). Mr. Cooper
is a former FDA Chief Counsel. Id. at 233.
138. David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liability for
Prescription Drugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to
Uniform Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 418 (1996).
139. LEE, supra note 88, at 78.
140. 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 (2000).
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allowed only if it can be proven that companies did not comply with
all the rules during the approval process. "141
Imposing punitive damages against a drug manufacturer
constitutes a finding that the manufacturer deserves punishment for
making the drug available to consumers because its conduct in doing
so was "grossly negligent, intentional, willful, wanton, malicious,
reckless, outrageous" or "exhibited a flagrant disregard for others."'42
However, it is ultimately the FDA's choice, not that of the
manufacturer, to permit the drug to be marketed in the United States.
Therefore, if the manufacturer acted in one of the aforementioned
reprehensible ways, it must have been in its conscious failure to
adhere to FDA testing and reporting requirements and in violation of
federal law. 43 This Comment argues that punitive damages should be
available against a drug manufacturer for an injury allegedly caused
by an FDA-approved pharmaceutical only when the plaintiff can
prove a violation of federal law by the manufacturer during the pre-
or post-market approval process.
III. PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS SHOULD NOT BE
SUBJECT TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES IF FDA REGULATIONS HAVE
BEEN FOLLOWED
Pharmaceutical manufacturers can be held liable for injuries to
drug users under three general doctrines: manufacturing defect,
design defect, and failure to warn.1" Manufacturing defect theories
are rarely raised in pharmaceutical cases and are thus not considered
in this discussion. 145  Plaintiffs seeking punitive damages in
141. See Anne C. Mulkern, Medical Liability Cap Sought: House Bill Limits Awards
from Doctors, Drugmakers, DENVER POST, July 26, 2005, at A-01 (citing claims that "the
bill provides equity for companies that have followed the rules while going through the 10-
to 15-year Food and Drug Administration approval process for their medications").
142. Pace, supra note 41, at 1618-19 (outlining the varying standards for punitive
damage entitlement in different states).
143. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
144. North Carolina, see Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 678, 268 S.E.2d
504, 509-10 (1980), and Virginia, see Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects,
Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 58 (Va. 1988), still do not recognize a cause of action in strict liability
for personal injury caused by a product.
145. A product "contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its
intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and
marketing of the product." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 2(a) (1998). When a manufacturing defect is found to be the cause of injury, strict
liability is imposed upon the manufacturer, and, therefore, there is no specific finding of
fault. Fault is assumed simply by the fact that the individual product deviates from its
intended design. MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 7 (2d ed.
2001). Because pharmaceutical products liability cases rarely allege such a defect, this
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pharmaceutical litigation more typically rely on design defect and
failure-to-warn theories.146 A closer examination of each theory
indicates that neither supports the award of punitive damages in the
pharmaceutical context.
A. Design Defect
A "design defect" can take one of two forms, depending on
whether a jurisdiction classifies claims of injury from pharmaceuticals
as general products liability actions or as their own separate
category. 147 Under the former view, a prescription drug "is defective
in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design ... and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe.' 1 48 Generally, a successful
design defect claim requires a finding of negligence, though strict
liability may be imposed in the case of an unreasonably dangerous
design.149 However, the design defect theory of liability, as worded by
the Restatement (Third) of Torts, does not imply that the
manufacturer knew of the design defect or concealed any indications
of a defect from consumers. In fact, the strict liability doctrine allows
a plaintiff to recover even if a reasonable manufacturer could not
have discovered the product's danger until after the drug had been
marketed to the plaintiff.5 ° This standard therefore deems a product
"not reasonably safe" if hindsight demonstrates a safer alternative
existed, even though the manufacturer acted reasonably in testing and
Comment only notes the apparent lack of logic in imposing damages that are, by
definition, based upon a malicious act or extreme recklessness, when the plaintiff has not
been required to show any specific state of mind in proving general liability. See
Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 508-10.
146. See Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability:
Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 18 n.85 (1992) (citing
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS
AND PRACTICE 298 (1st ed. 1987)) ("Courts have almost exclusively imposed punitive
damages in design defect and failure-to-warn cases. The inadvertent product defect case
that occurs because of imperfect quality control rarely, if ever, involves the kind of
reckless conduct that would support punitive damages.").
147. States treat the issue differently. See supra Part I (surveying the treatment of
punitive damages among state jurisdictions).
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998). The
recitation of Restatement provisions in this Comment is intended to show the general or
prevailing view; some states have adopted statutes regarding products liability doctrines
that may differ slightly.
149. JASPER, supra note 145, at 7.
150. See Aaron D. Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill:
Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 575, 591 (1985).
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designing the product.151 Just because the adverse side effects of the
drug "could have been reduced or avoided," then, the stated standard
does not even contemplate that the manufacturer was aware or
should have been aware of the potential adverse side effect at the
time of FDA approval.152 In fact, due to the FDA's requirements that
even the Phase III clinical trials involve only a few thousand patients,
such trials will inevitably miss the occasional rare adverse side effect
that may affect only 1 in 10,000 people.153 Because the definition of
liability premised on design defect does not require an injured
plaintiff to show that the manufacturer possessed the knowledge of a
potential injury that could have led to a better design-but only that a
better design was possible-a plaintiff does not bear the burden of
showing that the pharmaceutical company acted intentionally,
maliciously, recklessly, or even negligently with regard to the drug
design in order to prove himself entitled to compensatory damages.154
Indeed, a plaintiff in a pharmaceutical case will commonly not even
have to present evidence that a manufacturer had actual information
available during the design of the drug that would have allowed it to
alter a drug's composition in a way that would render the drug
safer.155
The fact that the generally-accepted design defect standard
imposes upon plaintiffs the burden of demonstrating that the risk of
harm through not adopting a "reasonable" alternative design was
151. Id.
152. As a matter of course; strict liability is widely recognized in design defect claims
against pharmaceutical manufacturers. See, e.g., Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189,
1195 (Alaska 1992); Bryant v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723,728 (Ga. Ct. App.
2003); Freeman v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 834 (Neb. 2000). But see
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.3d 470, 475-83 (Cal. 1988) (holding that strict liability may
not apply so long as a drug was properly prepared and labeled with warnings of possible
dangers that were known or reasonably knowable at the time of distribution).
153. LEE, supra note 88, at 77. If this number is unacceptably risky the proper course
of action, this Comment argues, is to pressure the FDA to require expanded clinical trials,
not to punish drug companies for the FDA's perceived shortcomings.
154. Whether this should be so is outside the scope of this Comment. However, for a
good discussion, see generally Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of
Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167 (2000) (arguing that
compliance with FDA regulations should have a preclusive effect on a plaintiff's ability to
be compensated for injuries allegedly caused by an approved drug).
155. A defendant drug manufacturer will occasionally prevail on such a claim if the
plaintiff fails to show the existence of an alternative design and the court finds that, as a
matter of law, the drug was an "unavoidably unsafe product." See, e.g., Ackley v. Wyeth
Labs., Inc., 919 F.2d 397, 399-403 (6th Cir. 1990) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant on a strict liability claim for injuries allegedly caused by defendant's DTP
vaccine). The manufacturer prevailed when the court held that DTP was unavoidably
unsafe and that no alternative design was available that was safer yet still as effective. Id.
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"foreseeable" 156 provides little relief to drug manufacturers. This
standard of recovery implies that the plaintiff can prevail by
demonstrating that the manufacturer could have produced a safer
drug and that the difference in harm between this hypothetical
pharmaceutical and the one actually produced justified its costs.
157
Yet in approving the pharmaceutical's NDA, the FDA undertook a
similar cost-benefit analysis and found that the efficacy benefits of the
drug outweighed any safety risks.158  Allowing plaintiffs to recover
from a good-faith manufacturer under these circumstances implies
either that the FDA erred in its cost-benefit analysis or that the lip
service given to foreseeability has no real viability in the products
liability context.
Jurisdictions treating design defect cases as general products
liability actions, therefore, do not require plaintiffs to demonstrate
that a drug manufacturer continued to market an allegedly harmful
drug while aware of a risk created by the product's design. This
leaves one to wonder upon what grounds a plaintiff's claim for
punitive damages in such a case is premised. Courts awarding
punitive damages in design defect cases considered under the general
products liability rubric thus struggle to articulate their logic when
addressing this issue. For example, in Masaki v. General Motors
Corp.,59 the Supreme Court of Hawaii assumed the availability of
punitive damages against the defendant manufacturer even though
the plaintiff premised his case on strict liability.16°  That court
defended its position by reasoning that "[a]lthough strict liability
dispenses with the need to prove fault in order to find the defendant
liable, it does not preclude consideration of the defendant's
aggravating conduct for the purpose of assessing punitive
damages."16' However, if a plaintiff can show both the existence of a
design defect and aggravating conduct on the part of the defendant,
156. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998);
supra note 148 and accompanying text.
157. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Regulating in Foresight Versus Liability in Hindsight:
The Case of Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REV. 813, 818 (1999) (arguing that the stated rule is more
a negligence standard, though plaintiffs continue to recover under the strict liability
regime).
158. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
159. 780 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1989).
160. Id. at 573 ("[W]e find no logical or conceptual difficulty in allowing a claim for
punitive damages in a products liability action based on strict liability."). Although the
state supreme court vacated the lower court's punitive award with this decision, it
remanded the case for reconsideration with instructions that the plaintiff must show
entitlement to punitive damages by a "clear and convincing standard of proof." Id. at 575.
161. Id.
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as contended by the Masaki court, his claim would not need to be
premised on strict liability in the first place.
Permitting punitive damages in design defect cases when
plaintiffs cannot show that a defendant consciously committed a
reprehensible act essentially imposes a presumption of knowledge of
all "qualities and characteristics" of a drug onto manufacturers and
implies that a defendant deserves punishment.162 This presumption
certainly eases the plaintiff's burden, but it does so on the basis of a
judge-made assumption, not on solid evidence of knowledge or intent
on the part of the manufacturer. Equally troubling is that the use of
such a presumption to punish a drug manufacturer who neither knew
nor should have known of a drug's dangers eliminates the deterrent
function that punitive damages are designed to serve. A
manufacturer cannot change present behavior based on a threat that
it will be imputed with knowledge in the future that it does not have,
and possibly cannot obtain, at present.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts treats pharmaceuticals
differently than other products, stating that a prescription drug
is not reasonably safe due to defective design if the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the drug ... are sufficiently great in
relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable
health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and
therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug ... for any
class of patients. 63
Unlike the aforementioned general definition of design defect,161 the
use of the word "foreseeable" occurs not once, but three times in the
formulation specific to prescription drugs. This implies that
drugmakers are charged with actual or constructive knowledge of the
possibilities of an injury occurring to the pharmaceutical's users, at a
frequency and intensity making the drug's risks outweigh its benefits.
Therefore, at trial under the design defect rubric, plaintiffs can
potentially collect punitive damages based on a finding of a
foreseeable defect and absent any actual knowledge of the defect by
the manufacturer.
This approach is problematic, however, because it attempts to
duplicate the inquiry undertaken by a team of experts at the FDA
162. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullogh, 676 S.W.2d 776, 780-81 (Ky. 1984)
(articulating the precise facts a manufacturer is presumed to know).
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 6(b) (1998)
(emphasis added).
164. See id. § 2(b).
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over a period of years, placing that inquiry into the hands of lay jurors
and condensing the time period for consideration into days or weeks.
Awarding punitive damages through this approach-upon a finding
that known risks outweighed known benefits-requires one of two
conclusions. The first is that the informed determination of the FDA
in approving the drug was incorrect. The second is that the FDA did
not have all the information necessary to make its determination,
presumably because this information was withheld by the drug
manufacturer. The prior view assumes an inadequacy with the FDA
procedures. There is no logical rationale for imposing punitive
damages against the manufacturer in this instance, because the
manufacturer neither "deserves" the punishment nor can it change its
behavior to remedy what the jury has determined to be a
shortcoming. In the latter situation-in which there is credible
evidence that FDA approval was obtained through unlawful
grounds-the presumption against punitive damages may be
rebutted. However, considering the extensive FDA procedures, it
should require an egregious omission that is directly related to the
plaintiff's injury for the jury to be allowed to consider punitive
damages-indeed, it is only in this case that wrongful behavior need
be punished and deterred, and the wrongful behavior cited must be
the misrepresentation to the FDA, not the alleged design defect itself.
B. Failure to Warn
The generally articulated standards imposing liability based upon
failure to warn, like those based upon defective design,165 vary
depending upon whether a jurisdiction classifies injuries allegedly
caused by pharmaceuticals as general products liability actions or as a
special class of products litigation. Jurisdictions treating the claims as
general products liability actions often state that a product "is
defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings ... and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders
the product not reasonably safe. ' 166  This standard, once again
employing the word "foreseeable," implies that to some degree the
manufacturer must have purposely or knowingly failed to include in
the product warning some danger of which the manufacturer was or
reasonably should have been aware. What this standard ignores,
165. See supra notes 147-48, 163 and accompanying text.
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998).
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when applied in the realm of prescription drugs, is that the FDA may
prohibit a manufacturer from warning of certain adverse reactions,
possibly due to a disagreement among experts as to the degree of
danger.167 The FDA has determined that when the risk of an adverse
reaction is either too unclear or too remote, it should not be included
in a drug's label due to the danger that the most important sections of
the label will be buried in superfluous text. 6
This issue is present in the pending Vioxx lawsuits, where one
major allegation driving plaintiffs' cases is that a panel conducting
post-market clinical trials for Merck had early data indicating the
higher risks of heart problems in patients using Vioxx as opposed to a
placebo.169 Merck argues that indications that the risk was statistically
significant were not conclusive until the end of the clinical trial, after
which the drug was promptly removed from the market. 7° Therefore,
each time this claim goes to a jury, twelve laypersons essentially will
be determining one of two things: whether Merck violated FDA
regulations and, if not, whether those FDA regulations are adequate
to ensure public safety.
A standard more tailored to pharmaceuticals states that a
prescription drug "is not reasonably safe due to inadequate
instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings
regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to: prescribing
and other health-care providers ... or the patient."'71 The problem
with this standard is that the FDA states exactly what warnings are
provided to health care providers17 2 and to patients. 173 In fact, there
have been a number of situations in which a pharmaceutical
manufacturer has been subject to liability under a failure-to-warn
167. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.21(c)(1) (2005) (prohibiting labels from including risks of
hazards about which there are differing opinions); id. § 201.57(d) (stating that
contraindication labeling should include only known, not theoretical, hazards); see also
Failure to Reveal Material Facts, 39 Fed. Reg. 33,229, 33,231-32 (Sept. 16, 1974) (codified
as amended at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (reflecting the FDA's refusal to approve a warning on a
drug label unless there is significant medical evidence of the risk).
168. See Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for
Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,446-47 (June 26, 1979).
169. Barbara Martinez, Merck Documents Shed Light on Vioxx Legal Battles, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 7, 2005, at Al.
170. Id.
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998).
172. Physicians receive a compilation of warning labels for all FDA-approved drugs in
the Physician's Desk Reference. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 135.
173. A package insert containing a drug's indications, dosing instructions, and warnings
must accompany each FDA-approved drug available to the public. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 201.56-.57 (2005) (detailing general and specific requirements for content and format of
prescription drug labels).
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theory for not employing a warning that was in fact proposed by the
manufacturer and expressly rejected by the FDA.174 For example, in
Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,'75 the Supreme Court of
Kansas upheld an award of punitive damages against a manufacturer
of oral contraceptives based on the plaintiff's contention that the
package insert did not warn of the risk of renal failure.176 Incredibly,
the court dismissed a letter introduced at trial from the FDA to the
manufacturer that stated the FDA's disagreement with the company
that a warning of the injury eventually suffered by plaintiff needed to
be added to the drug's package insert.177  Without explaining its
rationale, the court concluded that the manufacturer's argument that
it could not be held liable for failure to warn "ha[d] no merit"
because the "letter [could not] be construed as a clear determination
by the FDA that [the drug did] not merit warnings.' 1 78 Given the
FDA's authority to make the final determination on warnings
promulgated for prescribing doctors and the consuming public,'79 it
seems reasonable that the company would rely on even an informal
expression of the FDA's opinion regarding a particular warning when
formulating its drug label.
Similarly, in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,8 ° the Supreme
Court of New Jersey reversed a judgment in favor of a defendant
drug company and reinstated the plaintiff's claims for both
compensatory and punitive damages, dismissing the FDA's
involvement in the contents of the allegedly harmful drug's label,
which did not warn of the possibility of plaintiff's injury. 8' In
Feldman, an official at the FDA had specifically advised the
defendant against publicizing the warning because the FDA was still
studying the matter. 82
Aside from placing drug manufacturers in an impossible position
between plaintiffs who demand increased warnings and an FDA that
often rejects those warnings, the imposition of punitive damages on a
174. See Geiger & Rosen, supra note 138, at 420-21.
175. 681 P.2d 1038 (Kan. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984).
176. Id. at 1062-64.
177. Id. at 1057.
178. Id.
179. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An
Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1437, 1446 n.38 (1994) (explaining that the FDA reserves the ability to determine
whether there is a sufficient basis for including a given warning because adverse effects to
test subjects may prove to be coincidental or erroneous).
180. 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
181. Id. at 378-80, 393.
182. Id. at 379.
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failure-to-warn theory also fails to serve the deterrence and
punishment goals for which punitive awards are designed. If a
manufacturer is found liable based upon failure to warn, the jury has
essentially decided that the warning approved and, in fact mandated
by the FDA was incomplete or inadequate. Imputing fault on the
drug manufacturer for such a perceived oversight cannot encourage
the company to provide "better" warnings without simultaneously
encouraging the manufacturer to defy the FDA by rejecting the
warnings approved by the agency.183
The five general types of behavior giving rise to awards of
punitive damages in products liability cases are: inadequate testing
and manufacturing procedures, failure to warn of known dangers
before marketing, post-marketing failure to remedy known dangers,
fraudulent misconduct, and knowing violations of safety standards. 184
The safeguards provided by the FDA process sufficiently seek out
and eliminate these behaviors,"' making the imposition of punitive
damages necessary only in those instances where a manufacturer
commits an actual violation of an FDA requirement. This means that
unless the drug manufacturer's actions subject it to criminal or civil
penalties by the government, punitive damages are inappropriate.
Two examples illustrate the way the award of punitive damages
should center on FDA requirements and a manufacturer's good-faith
compliance with them. The FDA describes and requires compliance
183. Consider McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522 (Or. 1974). In
that case, the state supreme court affirmed a large jury verdict based upon the plaintiff's
allegation that the label on the defendant's oral contraceptives failed to warn of the risk of
injury that allegedly led to plaintiff's blindness. Id. at 537-44. The manufacturer argued
that the warnings on its package were written by the FDA and required by federal law. Id.
at 534. The court rejected this argument, holding that "the warnings given by an ethical
drug manufacturer may be found inadequate, '[a]lthough all of the government
regulations and requirements have been satisfactorily met in the production and
marketing of [the drug], and in the changes made in the literature.'" Id. (quoting Yarrow
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.S.D. 1967)). Given this holding, one
wonders how the manufacturer could have absolved itself of liability without violating the
regulations promulgated by the FDA. See Viscusi et al., supra note 179, at 1469 ("Once
the FDA has made a determination about proposed pharmaceutical labeling, it would be a
violation of federal law for the manufacturer to attempt to deviate from that judgment.").
184. David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 1257, 1329 (1974) (arguing that strong public policy rationales mandate allowing
punitive damage awards in products liability cases).
185. See, e.g., Viscusi et al., supra note 179, at 1478 (arguing that "the requirements for
an NDA are so extensive that, at the margin, the FDCA probably over-deters" a
pharmaceutical manufacturer from trying to present the FDA with false or misleading
information).
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with what it believes are adequate testing and production practices.186
A manufacturer that conducts FDA-mandated testing and still fails to
detect an idiosyncratic response-such as one occurring in 1 out of
every 10,000 patients 87-should not be liable for punitive damages.
In this instance, the FDA determined that the increase in the cost of
drugs resulting from further clinical trials involving thousands of
additional people outweighed the benefit of identifying a rare
reaction.'88 Having complied with the safeguards premised on this
calculation, imposing punitive damages ignores the need for
considering economic and medical efficiency. On the other hand, if
the manufacturer makes some misrepresentation to the FDA about
the amount of testing it has performed with regard to a new drug, and
the FDA relies on this misrepresentation in approving the drug, the
manufacturer has violated FDA regulations. In such a case, an
affirmative statement from the FDA could properly form the basis for
concluding that the manufacturer acted intentionally or maliciously in
a private tort action.
The question comes down to whether lay jurors should preempt
the determinations of teams of medical and statistical experts
employed by the FDA. Approving only 1 out of every 5,000
investigated drugs, the FDA affirms on a daily basis-through the
opinions of the agency's scientists and regulatory professionals-that
pharmaceutical manufacturers are offering for sale the safest and
most cost-effective drugs possible for the conditions they purport to
treat. Courts and legislatures should defer to the FDA's extensive
risk-benefit analysis and stop forcing manufacturers to choose
between FDA compliance and self-preservation. Regrettably, courts
continually eschew such deference even when drug manufacturers
fully comply with FDA regulations.
1 89
IV. ABSOLVING MANUFACTURERS OF COMPENSATORY LIABILITY
This Comment argues that FDA regulations provide adequate
protection to the consumers of prescription drugs, eliminating the
justification for the award of punitive damages against drug
186. See supra notes 90-139 and accompanying text (detailing the FDA's extensive
testing requirements).
187. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
188. See Gregory C. Jackson, M.D., Comment, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May
Be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 199, 233 (1992).
189. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J. 1984) (stating that "the
FDA's determination, even if it consisted of a risk-utility analysis, would not supplant the
risk-utility balancing required in the judicial process").
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manufacturers. 190 This Comment also demonstrates how the award of
punitive damages in the context of prescription drugs does not serve
the punishment and deterrence objectives traditionally justifying such
awards. 191 This Comment therefore strongly supports the elimination
of punitive damages against drug manufacturers, possibly through
federal legislation preempting the jurisdiction of state courts, where
verdicts can vary more dramatically. This position may appear
radical, but others would go further still. Some members of Congress
and a greater number of courts and legal scholars argue that-absent
evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or bribery-the makers of
prescription drugs that receive FDA approval should be immune
from all liability on claims against an approved product.9 2  These
congressmen and scholars would include even compensatory damages
in this prohibition.
Professor Richard B. Stewart, for instance, points to a report by
the American Law Institute in support of his proposition that, with
narrow exceptions, compliance with an administrative agency's
regulatory requirements should preclude tort liability based on
negligence. 193 Professor Stewart argues that the risk-benefit analysis
undertaken by an agency like the FDA is discounted when a jury is
confronted with an individual case of injury, and that juries in these
cases often focus disproportionately on the injury suffered by the
specific plaintiff rather than analyzing whether the product is socially
beneficial to the general public.194 Professor Margaret Gilhooley
relies on a different rationale in her argument for a regulatory
compliance defense, contending that the current uncertain liability
standards and high costs of litigation may discourage the innovation
190. See supra Part II.
191. See supra Part III.
192. For example, several courts across the country articulate strong public policy
rationales against all tort liability for drug manufacturers. See, e.g., Hackett v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 246 F. Supp. 591, 595 (W.D. Tex. 2002) ("To allow plaintiffs to sue for defective
design of prescription drugs would provide a disincentive to companies to develop new
drugs and would allow juries to second-guess the FDA's approval of the drugs for
marketing."); Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988) (citing the probable
negative effects of strict liability on pharmaceutical manufacturers and concluding that
they should not be strictly liable for injuries caused by their products so long as the drugs
were properly prepared and labeled with sufficient warnings); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.,
813 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1991) (holding that prescription drugs approved by the FDA cannot,
as a matter of law, be defective if "properly prepared, compounded, packaged, and
distributed" in accordance with FDA regulations).
193. Stewart, supra note 154, at 2167. Professor Stewart relies on an ALl Reporter's
Study from 1991, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, a project for which he was
the Chief Reporter until 1989. Id. at 2167 n.1.
194. Id. at 2174-75.
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of useful new drugs and that many pharmaceutical cases improperly
premise liability on failure to warn, when the FDA has a large say in
the content of drug warnings.'95 David R. Geiger and Mark D. Rosen
argue that allowing any sort of tort liability subsequent to FDA
approval amounts to the "retrospective jury nullification" of FDA
regulations, fundamentally disadvantaging drug manufacturers
relying on compliance with FDA regulations. 96 They argue that the
FDCA should preempt state tort law and disallow any claims based
on injury caused by an approved drug. 97
These contentions are problematic for two reasons. First, the
fact that a drug was approved by the FDA does not make the
plaintiff's actual injuries any less the result of his use of the drug in
question. Professor Stewart's analysis, for example, suggests that the
few people injured by a socially beneficial product are "unlucky losers
in the risk-risk lottery." '198 The premise of the American tort system,
however, is that persons injured as a result of another's actions
deserve to be compensated by the party at fault.'99 "Fault" in this
context does not imply intent or malice in the same way that "fault"
gives rise to punitive damages. Instead, "fault" is synonymous with
"causation" in the context of compensatory damages. 0 If the
195. Margaret Gilhooley, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory Compliance,
and Patient Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1481, 1483 (1994). Professor Gilhooley does
caution, however, that more research into the adequacy and efficacy of current warnings
should be pursued before casting aside the current tort standards entirely. Id. at 1506.
196. Geiger & Rosen, supra note 138, at 396-97. Mr. Geiger and Mr. Rosen are both
practicing attorneys with significant experience in handling pharmaceutical litigation. Id.
at 395.
197. Id. passim.
198. Stewart, supra note 154, at 2181. Professor Stewart suggests that to remedy this
problem a system might be established whereby a tax is placed on all approved drugs, and
that the unlucky few who are injured by an approved pharmaceutical be compensated for
their out-of-pocket expenses from this fund. Id. at 2181-82. This insurance system,
however, would pass costs onto consumers in the same way that pharmaceutical
companies must now insure themselves for liability for compensatory damages, providing
only negligible advantages over the tort system, particularly if an injured consumer
unhappy with the administrative determination of his damages could seek judicial review.
199. See, e.g., Thomas v. Barton Lodge II, Ltd., 174 F.3d 636, 648 (5th Cir. 1999)
("[Tihe general principle of damages is compensation to plaintiff for his actual loss
resulting from defendant's wrong."); Plummer v. Abbott Labs., 568 F. Supp. 920, 922-23
(D.R.I. 1983) ("Tort damages are awarded in order fully and adequately to compensate an
individual for injuries sustained. Thus, the underlying basis for such damages is the
premise that the individual was injured in contemplation of law." (internal citations
omitted)); Croley v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 759 A.2d 682, 689 (D.C. 2000) ("[T]he
primary purpose of compensatory damages in personal injury cases is to make the plaintiff
whole.").
200. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 418 (1992)
("[C]ausation, fault, and compensatory damages ... determine the victim's entitlement
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defendant or the defendant's product was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury, then the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the
monetary loss he actually suffered because of the injury.
Second, the preemption doctrine clearly does not apply in
pharmaceutical cases. The Supreme Court has emphatically stated
that federal law does not preempt a state law cause of action absent
clear congressional intent that federal law govern.2"1 The FDCA
merely outlines the steps a manufacturer must take to market a drug
in the United States. It does not create a cause of action.2°
Furthermore, Congress had the opportunity to preempt state tort
liability for faulty pharmaceuticals within the FDCA and specifically
declined to do so. In 1976, Congress passed the Medical Devices
Amendments ("MDAs") to the FDCA.203 The MDAs prohibit states
from imposing on medical device manufacturers any standards or
requirements that are "different from, or in addition to" those to
which the manufacturers must adhere under federal law.2 4 The new
provisions gave the FDA regulatory authority over a broad range of
products including those deemed "class III medical devices."205 This
classification includes heart valves, pacemakers, replacement joints,
and other devices that are implanted into the body.2 °6 In adopting the
MDA, Congress recognized that "if a substantial number of differing
requirements applicable to a medical device are imposed by
against the injurer by tracing the normative and physical sequence of wrongfulness from
its origin in the defendant's action to its terminus in the plaintiffs suffering.").
201. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9-11 (2003) (holding that even
though the plaintiff's complaint articulated only state law claims for usury, removal was
proper because the bank's defense was that it complied with federal interest rate limits
and the National Bank Act purported to provide "an exclusive federal cause of action for
usury against national banks"); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64-67 (1987)
(holding that removal of employer's state-law breach of contract claim to federal court
based on federal question jurisdiction was proper because Congress clearly intended that
there be a cause of action under the ERISA section cited by plaintiff); Hillborough
County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713-16 (1985) (holding that when the
FDA expressly stated that it did not intend its blood plasma collection regulations to be
exclusive, local ordinances that provided additional restrictions and requirements did not
run afoul of the Supremacy Clause).
202. See, e.g., Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding
that the FDCA allows only the government a cause of action and does not afford a private
right of action to individuals); Rodriguez v. SK & F Co., 833 F.2d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 1987)
(same).
203. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c-360k (2000)).
204. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
205. Susan A. Allinger, Federal Preemption of Products Liability Actions Against
Medical Device Manufacturers, 27 TEX. TRIAL L.F. 5, 5 (1993).
206. Id.
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jurisdictions other than the Federal government, interstate commerce
would be unduly burdened. ' 27  Therefore, Congress specifically
understands the problems a manufacturer faces when confronted with
conflicting standards from the FDA and the judicial system, yet
declined to take steps to apply this protection to prescription drugs.
It would be inappropriate to entirely exempt drugmakers from any
sort of judicial inquiry whatsoever in the face of such clear
congressional intent to the contrary.08  However, it is also
inappropriate to allow punitive damage awards against manufacturers
who are required to comply with federal regulations that sometimes
frustrate the manufacturer's efforts at full disclosure.
V. CLASS ACTION REFORM
On February 10, 2005, the United States Senate overwhelmingly
passed a long-debated bill requiring that all class-action lawsuits
against corporations be heard in federal rather than in state court.2 9
The bill sailed to victory in the House by a 279 to 149 vote, and
President Bush signed it into law on February 18, 2005.210 The law is
designed to allow corporate defendants to remove many class action
lawsuits from state to federal court where, on average, judgments
prove less costly for corporate defendants.2 1' Then-House Majority
Leader Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) focused on the bill's impact on the
consuming public and the effective function of the courts in lending
his support to the legislation. Shortly after the House vote, he stated
that "[c]onsumers and businesses alike have been victimized by
lawsuit abuse. Court dockets are backed up, companies are paying
lawyers instead of employees, and our economy is suffering for it all.
Class action fairness is not just reform; it's self-defense. "212
207. H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 45-46 (1976).
208. This is not to suggest that legislation with a preemptive effect could not or should
not be adopted. The calls for this type of legislation are mounting. See, e.g., Viscusi et al.,
supra note 179, at 1478 (arguing that preemptive legislation is needed to prohibit courts
"from co-regulating pharmaceuticals through the award of tort damages" because "the
FDCA does not [only] establish minimum standards for prescription drug products or
their labeling").
209. S. 5, 109th Cong., 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
210. Stephen Labaton, Quick, Early Gains Embolden Business Lobby, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 2005, at C1.
211. David Rogers, Class-Action Bill Sails in Senate, and Heads Quickly to the House,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2005, at A2. Under the law, a corporate defendant may remove a
class action suit to federal court when the aggregate of all plaintiffs' claims exceeds $5
million and when minimal diversity of citizenship requirements are met. Id.
212. DeLay: Decade-Long Fight Brings Class Action Fairness, House Sends Historic
Class Action Measure to President (Feb. 17, 2005), http://www.majorityleader.gov/news.
asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=393. DeLay claims that provisions in the law will prevent
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Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) stated that the purpose of the
Class Action Fairness Act ("Act") is "to prevent judge shopping to
States and even counties where courts and judges have a prejudicial
predisposition on cases." '213 Specter expressed his sentiments that
"[r]egrettably, the history has been that there are some States in the
United States and even some counties where there is forum shopping,
which means that lawyers will look to that particular State, that
particular county to get an advantage. 2 14  The Act attempts to
combat this problem by providing that defendants may remove most
state-law class actions to federal court and by relaxing diversity of
citizenship and other jurisdictional requirements.215 Yet, the simple
elimination of the "complete diversity rule" merely expands federal
court jurisdiction over class actions to the extent that federal courts
may now hear any cases where one named plaintiff or a requisite
number of non-named class members live in a different state from the
defendant.216 Recent developments in the Vioxx litigation illustrate
the potential inefficacy of the Act insofar as it promises to offer
defendants the protections of a federal forum.217 A group of
plaintiffs' attorneys who claim to represent 20,000 former Vioxx users
recently requested that Judge Eldon E. Fallon remand their cases
from federal to state court.218  This "breakaway group of lawyers"
may succeed in exempting itself from the Act's more liberal diversity
requirements by including as a defendant an individual or entity-
such as a prescribing physician-that resides in the same state as one
of their plaintiffs.219
outcomes such as the Bridgestone/Firestone class action outcome, where plaintiffs'
attorneys collected $19 million while their clients received nothing, and the Microsoft
antitrust cases, where attorneys claimed hundreds of millions of dollars while consumers
received $5-$10 in voucher coupons. Id.
213. 151 CONG. REC. S999 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement of Sen. Specter).
214. Id.
215. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
216. Id.
217. Although a federal district court must apply the punitive damages law of the state
in which it sits, see infra note 222 and accompanying text, corporate defendants
nonetheless see federal forums as more favorable in part because the Federal Rules of
Evidence impose greater restrictions on the amount and type of evidence a plaintiff may
introduce. See Martinez, supra note 7.
218. Martinez, supra note 7.
219. See id. The admitted goal of these attorneys is to overwhelm Merck's lawyers with
litigation on numerous fronts rather than allowing the drug company to focus solely on the
federal multidistrict litigation. See id.
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Furthermore, given the current jurisdictional variation in
punitive damages law, 220 even if loophole free, the Act alone is
unlikely to remedy the quandary in which pharmaceutical
manufacturers are often placed when courts essentially reevaluate
FDA standards on a case-by-case basis. The court battle over venue
in the Vioxx litigation provides an excellent example. Many of these
cases are slated for hearing in federal courts,2 ' yet both sides
continue to fight for their preferred forum. Moreover, the lack of
federal common law upon which a federal court may determine the
reasonableness of a punitive damage award requires a federal district
court to apply the law of the state in which it sits.2 22 Therefore, the
state survey of punitive damage law preceding this discussion remains
relevant regardless of the purpose of the class action reform. Federal
judges are still bound not only by any legislative mandates on the
availability of punitive damages, but may also be guided by a state's
case law in determining how large of an award has been deemed
acceptable in that jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
While the imposition of punitive damages against pharmaceutical
companies has a material effect on the production of prescription
drugs, the primary issue is whether such awards provide an effective
benefit in terms of enhancing widespread drug safety. Many United
States drug manufacturers currently spend more money on products
liability insurance and litigation defense than on research and
development efforts that could provide new and beneficial drugs to
the public.223 Moreover, evidence from jurisdictions that do not allow
punitive damages against pharmaceutical companies suggests that the
deterrent effect of any litigation at all accomplishes what punitive
damages purport to achieve because the stigma of a liability claim in
the eyes of the public provides adequate incentives for drugmakers to
refrain from "bad" conduct.224 The demonstrated effect of punitive
damages, therefore, has been not to change drug companies' conduct
during pharmaceutical development and manufacture, but instead to
220. See supra notes 24-51 and accompanying text.
221. As of October 2005, approximately 1,800 of the nearly 5,000 Vioxx suits were
awaiting adjudication in federal court in New Orleans. Alex Berenson, Maker of Vioxx
Says Some Suits May Be Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2005, at Al.
222. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the State .... There is no federal general common law.").
223. S. REP. No. 105-32, at 8-9 (1997).
224. Id. at 11-12.
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deter these corporations from developing new drugs in the first
place.225
Adding to the fact that the financial benefits of punitive damages
benefit the few at the expense of the many is the unpredictable nature
of such damages. 226  The inconsistent jurisdictional approaches to
punitive damages-both with regard to allowable award amounts and
standards for entitlement-create massive disparities in the size of
awards from state to state.227 This troubling variation is compounded
by the fact that the instructions given by judges to juries regarding
punitive damages are often extremely inadequate, leading to even
more markedly varying and arbitrary results.228  Finally, the judicial
system's inability to carefully evaluate the substantive scientific issues
involved in drug reactions forces courts and juries to base their
decisions to award damages on non-scientific factors, such as the
appearance of the plaintiff and other witnesses, rather than on the
underlying issues presented in expert testimony.29 Last summer's
$253 million verdict against Merck is illustrative. Jurors said that
"much of the science sailed right over their heads" and they "focused
225. See Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulations of
Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REV. 773, 782 (1990) ("[T]he ex ante risks that the tort
system imposes on pharmaceutical manufacturers can have marked adverse effects on the
development, marketing, and pricing of medications."); see also Bruce N. Kuhlik &
Richard F. Kingham, The Adverse Effects of Standardless Punitive Damage Awards on
Pharmaceutical Development and Availability, 45 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 693, 699 (1990)
(citing American Medical Association findings that liability concerns have a "profound
negative impact on the development of new medical technologies" and that "new products
are not being developed or are being withheld from the market because of liability
concerns").
226. See Note, supra note 225, at 782-83 ("The threat of tort liability not only
unnecessarily raises the costs of health care, but may also lead to an inappropriate
decrease in the use of the medication, as the price will no longer reflect the relative risks
and benefits of the drug.").
227. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: VERDICTS AND
CASE RESOLUTION IN FIVE STATES 89-99,25-31 (1989) (concluding that in the five states
studied punitive damages varied a great deal in size and incidence).
228. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 588-92 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 46 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Alabama's jury instructions regarding punitive damages are
unconstitutionally vague because juries are "offer[ed] no principled basis for
distinguishing those tortfeasors who should be liable for punitive damages from those who
should not be liable").
229. See, e.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 268-98 (N.D. Ga. 1986)
(assessing over $5 million in damages against a manufacturer of a contraceptive jelly which
the plaintiff claimed caused birth defects in her child). While the overwhelming
agreement in the scientific community was that there was no causal relationship between
the jelly and the birth defects, the trial judge supplanted that consensus with his own
determination that because plaintiffs experts were more "credible," causation was
sufficiently established. Id.
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instead on evidence they understood: that a big corporation allegedly
covered up defects with its product. '23 ° Predictable results under such
a scheme are unlikely, if not impossible.
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 will also be ineffective to
curb the problem in many cases due to the obligation of a federal
district court to apply the law of the state in which it sits, including
punitive damage precedents.231 Short of a federal law mandating the
preemptive effect regulations in the context of prescription drugs
similar to the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, or a widespread
recognition of the fact that it is not logical to punish drug
manufacturers for a judicial determination of the inadequacy of the
FDA's processes, drugmakers will continue to struggle with the same
Catch-22, wrestling with the choice to obey the FDA or be
"punished" and "deterred" from doing so through the imposition of
punitive damages.
JOAN E. SHREFFLER"
230. Heather Won Tesoriero et al., Merck Loss Jolts Drug Giant, Industry: In
Landmark Vioxx Case, Jury Tuned Out Science, Explored Coverup Angle, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 22, 2005, at Al.
231. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
* The author wishes to dedicate this piece to her parents, Drs. Jack and Carol
Shreffler, for their unfailing support and encouragement over the past twenty-five years.
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